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Abstract
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has been the 
largest supplier of defense systems to the Republic of Korea (ROK). 
The imperative of maintaining military interoperability with the 
U.S. armed forces often proved a decisive factor for ROK decision 
makers. However, ROK officials have tried to increase the amount 
of military equipment, technology, and services that South Korea 
acquires from non-U.S. sources, with a priority given to domestic 
suppliers. ROK procurement officials have concluded that U.S. 
companies do not always provide the best deals in terms of cost, 
performance, and timeliness. In addition, they are frustrated with 
the restrictions and terms typically associated with U.S. defense 
imports, especially limitations on the transfer and re-sale of U.S. 
technologies as well as the problems entailed in meeting South 
Korean demands for substantial offsets. ROK governments have 
also sought as much as possible to draw on the country’s own 
burgeoning defense industries. At first, ROK defense companies 
limited private R&D spending, overcapacity and other structural 
inefficiencies, small number of exportable products, limited 
competitiveness in foreign markets, and bans on the sale of items 
with U.S. technology to third countries constrained their actual and 
potential contributions. But over time ROK firms have overcome 
many of these obstacles. In addition, the same factors that have 
enabled South Korea’s industry to substitute for previously 
imported defense items have made them better able to compete 
for foreign sales: the growing sophistication and size of South 
Korea’s civilian economy, the companies’ improving human capital 
and productivity, mandatory technology transfers and offsets, and 
extensive ROK government support for the industry.
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Introduction
During the past decade, the ROK has become a global player 
with worldwide interests. ROK policy makers have raised their 
country’s international profile by hosting high-level events, 
participating in international peacekeeping, and promoting South 
Korea as a model for combining democracy with rapid economic 
development. Seoul hosted the November 2010 G-20 Summit, the 
November 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and the 
March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. South Korea has vigorously 
participated in the activities of various subsidiary and specialized 
UN agencies, as well as other international organizations. In 
October 2012, several years after a South Korean foreign minister 
was selected as UN Secretary General, the ROK was elected to 
hold a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council for the 
2013 and 2014 terms. South Korea is also a committed member of 
various international nonproliferation regimes, such as the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
The United States and the rest of the international community 
have benefitted from South Korea’s growing global leadership 
and engagement. The United States and South Korea are also 
coordinating more effectively and comprehensively on global 
diplomatic, development, and defense issues. South Korea has 
more development workers serving abroad than any other 
country after the United States. ROK and U.S. planners have 
discussed ways that their two militaries can support each other in 
humanitarian and disaster-relief missions, as well as other extra-
Korean contingencies, by building on their existing Peninsula-
based cooperation. Not only does the ROK accept the necessity 
for U.S. Forces Korea to contribute to its possible extra-peninsular 
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missions, but also South Korea’s own military modernization 
program, the Defense Reform Project 2020 adopted in 
2005, has increased its capacity to participate in missions 
outside of Korea. South Korea now stations hundreds of its 
troops overseas, and has twice commanded multinational 
counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. The ROK has 
deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan 
and is helping train the Afghanistan National Security Forces 
as they prepare for the departure of most Western combat 
forces at the end of 2014.2
Despite its small size and limited population, the ROK’s 
economy has become one of the world’s largest. South Korea 
has joined the elite Group of Twenty (G-20) leading industrial 
countries and has negotiated free trade agreements with many 
foreign partners. ROK companies are expanding their presence 
in global markets as well. For example, South Korea has rapidly 
emerged as one of the world’s leading suppliers of civil nuclear 
energy technologies and services. Many of these trends are also 
replicated in the defense sector. South Korea has built up one of 
the most impressive defense industrial bases among the newly 
industrialized states in the Asia-Pacific. The country’s total 
military expenditure surpassed $31 billion in 2012, making it 
the third largest defense spender in Asia and the 12th largest in 
the world.3 South Korea has become one of the largest markets 
for conventional weapons for its military, the world’s eighth 
largest with some 680,000 soldiers, 2,500 tanks, 850 fighter 
jets, 100 helicopters, and about a dozen submarines and major 
surface warships.4 According to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, during the 2008-2012 period, South 
Korea accounted for five percent of all global imports of major 
conventional weapons; of these imports, 77 percent came from 
the United States, 15 percent from Germany, and 5 percent 
from France.5
Yet, over time, South Korea has reduced the percentage of 
these weapons that it has purchased from U.S. sources, 
while raising the share of arms imported from non-U.S. 
companies and the proportion of weapons manufactured in 
South Korea. Meanwhile, ROK companies have become major 
players in the global defense industry, which has for decades 
been dominated by Russian, European, and U.S. firms. South 
Korea’s annual arms exports reached $2.4 billion in 2011 and 
the government hopes to achieve $3 billion in arms exports 
in 2013.6 The South Korean Defense Agency for Technology 
and Quality expects this figure to double to $4 billion by 
2020.7 ROK defense exports compete internationally in the 
armored vehicle, shipbuilding, and aerospace sectors. Among 
other considerations, the ROK’s changing role in international 
arms markets poses new challenges and opportunities for its 
foreign partners, including the United States. 
Buying Beyond the United States
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has been 
the largest supplier of defense systems to South Korea due to 
the two countries’ strategic ties, joint military commands and 
exercises, South Koreans’ long familiarity with U.S. weaponry, 
and interoperability considerations. Initially, South Korea lacked 
a major defense industrial sector, and buying weapons from 
the United States was seen as a natural means of reinforcing 
the bilateral alliance upon which the new state of South 
Korea depended. Beginning in the mid-1970s, South Korea 
initiated an aggressive and increasingly ambitious defense 
industrialization program, with the long-term goal of establishing 
“a basic foundation for a self-defense capability for the 
twenty-first century.”8 The motives for this indigenous defense 
industrialization were not only military, but also economic 
and political. The ROK consciously pursued a parallel strategy 
of “security and development,” that is, building up its heavy 
industry and high-technology sectors while striving for greater 
self-sufficiency in arms production.9 Moreover, South Korea 
pursued an advanced arms production capability to enhance its 
international status and influence.10
By the 1980s, the South Korean defense industry was producing 
a variety of unsophisticated combat equipment, including small 
arms like the K2 rifle, short-and medium-range missiles such 
as the Hyunmu, short-range field artillery like 155mm self-
propelled howitzers, small-scale naval vessels like fast attack 
patrol boats, the Hughes 500MD helicopter, and the F-5E Tiger II 
fighter aircraft.11 But the United States still had a dominant role 
in South Korea’s developing defense industry due to these ROK 
firms’ licensing and co-production agreements with major U.S. 
defense companies. In turn, U.S. corporations received large 
ROK defense contracts to co-produce these ROK weapons as 
well as supply more advanced systems that the ROK industry was 
unable to manufacture. U.S. firms also enjoyed the opportunity 
to import inexpensive defense components from South Korea’s 
manufacturing plants, which typically had lower labor costs and 
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other production expenditures.12 One reason why the United 
States and ROK governments favored this close cooperation was 
that their militaries benefited from using the same weapons, 
making it easier to share logistics, tactics, and other military 
elements. The imperative of maintaining military interoperability 
with the U.S. armed forces has often proved a decisive factor in 
Seoul’s defense procurement decisions. In recent years, significant 
U.S. sales and co-production of defense equipment have included: 
the K-1 (Type 88) Tank, SAM-X surface-to-air missile, P-3 maritime 
patrol aircraft, F-16 C/D fighters, UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, the 
T-50 “Golden Eagle” advanced trainer jet, F-15K jet fighters, and 
the KDX III Naval Destroyer. These systems continue to form the 
backbone of the ROK’s military. 
However, during the past two decades, ROK officials have tried 
to increase the military equipment, technology, and services 
that South Korea acquires from non-U.S. sources, with a priority 
given to domestic suppliers. The policy of diversifying beyond 
U.S. defense firms began in the 1980s, but was accelerated 
when the Roh Moo Hyun government sought to enhance South 
Korea’s ability to pursue policies independent of Washington, 
manifested in part by Roh’s decision to seek wartime operational 
control (OPCON) of South Korea’s armed forces.13 More recently, 
commercial rather than economic considerations have been 
driving Seoul to buy more non-U.S. weapons. ROK officials 
have concluded that U.S. companies do not always provide the 
best deals in terms of cost, performance, and timeliness. In 
addition, the policy now reflects ROK officials’ frustrations with 
the restrictions and terms typically associated with U.S. defense 
imports, especially limitations on the transfer and re-sale of 
U.S. technologies as well as the problems entailed in meeting 
South Korean demands for substantial local content and other 
offsets. Competing foreign governments and companies have 
often proven more forthcoming than their U.S. counterparts in 
agreeing to transfer sensitive military technology to South Korea 
to offset defense sales. 
Over time, the ROK has increasingly acquired its weapons from 
other countries as well as manufactured its own weapons 
systems. At first, foreign defense firms complained about the 
difficulties of competing with long-established U.S. rivals in 
the ROK market. But in recent years, South Korean officials 
have resisted Washington’s pressure to buy some expensive 
U.S.-made weapons systems, such as the PAC-3 air and missile 
defense system, the SM-3/Aegis ballistic missile defense system, 
and the Apache attack helicopter, while making major contracts 
with other foreign competitors. In August 2011, the Ministry of 
National Defense’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration 
(DAPA) announced it would procure antisubmarine helicopters. 
The British AgustaWestland AW-159 Wildcat helicopter and 
the U.S. Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopter were the main 
competitors. Given the advantage of interoperability and 
the traditional relationship between the United States and 
South Korea, it seemed likely that Sikorsky would win the 
contract. During the DAPA evaluation in September 2012, the 
SH-60 Seahawk helicopter had a higher rating. But the DAPA 
unexpectedly announced in January 2013 that AgustaWestland 
won the tender.14 Last year, the DAPA rejected the U.S. plan to 
sell four Global Hawk UAVs, worth $1.2 billion, to South Korea. 
In June 2013, the DAPA announced that it would buy the Taurus 
KEPD-350, a joint venture between European groups MBDA and 
Saab, rather than Lockheed Martin’s AGM-157, for its Joint Air to 
Surface Standoff missile project.15 A major reason for the decision 
was the U.S. government’s reluctance to relax restrictions on 
the export of its most advanced missile technologies.16 Other 
notable European successes in the South Korean defense market 
include the SAM-X project, which purchased the German MIM-
104C Patriot PAC-2; the K-2 Black Panther Tank; Korea Aerospace 
Industries (KAI)’s Surion (helicopter) research and development 
contract with Eurocopter; and the MBDA Missile System’s Mistral 
missiles. Furthermore, on August 27, 1995, Israel and South 
Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation 
in Logistics and the Defense Industry, which established a 
committee that meets regularly to exchange information about 
military technology. Between 2005 and 2010, Israel exported 
$187 million worth of defense commodities to South Korea.17 In 
January 2011, the ROK awarded Israel’s Elisra Electronic Systems 
a $29 million contract to supply Airborne Electronic Warfare 
(AEW) Suites and missile warning systems for the ROK air force’s 
CN-235 aircraft. In addition, the ROK purchased Israel Aerospace 
Industries’ Harpy loitering anti radar UAV and its Green Pine 
phased array long radar.18
Import Substitution 
While considering a wider range of foreign suppliers, the South 
Korean government has sought to purchase more defense items 
from the country’s own burgeoning defense industries. More 
than a decade ago, the ROK’s Defense White Paper 1999 affirmed 
a commitment to acquire “the ability to independently develop 
primary weapons systems for core force capability.” The more 
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recent Defense Reform Plan 2020, enacted in 2005, emphasized 
a self-reliant defense posture through increasing indigenous 
capabilities and defense R&D. The Plan aimed to grow the 
defense budget 11.1 percent annually through 2015 and 7.1 
through 2020.19 Although defense spending has not grown as 
rapidly as planned, private defense R&D investment increased 
from $132.2 billion in 2005 to $410.7 billion in 2008.20 South 
Korea’s defense R&D budget in 2010 was 1,795 billion won, or 
approximately US$1.5 billion, comprising around 6 percent of 
total military spending.21
At first, ROK defense companies’ limited private R&D spending, 
overcapacity and other structural inefficiencies, small number of 
exportable products, limited competitiveness in foreign markets, 
and bans on the sale of items with U.S. technology to third 
countries constrained their actual and potential contributions. 
For a while, most arms manufacturing centered on licensed 
production of foreign military systems, such as the U.S. F-5 and 
F-16 fighters and the German Type-209 submarine. Production 
gradually progressed to indigenously developed equipment, such 
as the T-50, the K1/K1A1 main battle tank, and the KDX-I, II, and 
III destroyers. In recent years the ROK has built a broad-based 
defense industry with particular strengths in the aerospace, 
land ordnance, and shipbuilding sectors. At present, 80 percent 
of South Korea’s arms are procured domestically, including 
main battle tanks, armored vehicles, warships, submarines, and 
many missiles and combat aircraft.22 South Korea has recently 
developed its own anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, a 
new tank (the XK-2) and infantry fighting vehicle (the K21), and it 
plans to build its own class of attack submarines and a variety of 
advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).23
The South Korean government has used defense contracts and 
other means to develop the country’s private defense industry. 
Like Japan, South Korea has relied heavily on the country’s small 
number of large industrial conglomerates (chaebol), such as 
Samsung, Hyundai, and LG, rather than state-owned enterprises 
to carry out national arms production. Local arms manufacturing 
is heavily concentrated in just a few chaebols: Hyundai Rotem 
builds main battle tanks; Doosan Infracore, armored vehicles; LIG 
Nex 1 (formerly LG Precision), missile systems and electronics; 
Samsung Techwin, jet engines and artillery systems; and 
Hyundai Heavy Industries, surface combatants and submarines. 
In addition, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI, jointly owned 
by Samsung, Doosan, and Hyundai) produces all of the country’s 
military aircraft, including the T-50, the KT-1 ‘Woong-Bee’ 
intermediate trainer, helicopters, and some UAVs. 
The South Korean government has been heavily involved in 
the arms production process by providing direct and indirect 
subsidies to manufacturers, underwriting defense research and 
development planning, and designating firms (such as KAI) as 
monopolistic suppliers of critical military equipment.24 Defense 
research and development (R&D) in South Korea is managed 
by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), which has a 
staff of several thousand people, mostly engineers, technicians, 
scientists, and other personnel engaged in research and 
development. ADD undertakes the R&D of weapons systems 
and core technologies, manages the development of dual-use 
and core technologies, and conducts operational testing and 
evaluation of developmental systems. It is responsible to the 
DAPA, which oversees armaments acquisition in South Korea, 
including determining requirements, approving R&D projects, 
and assessing testing and evaluation results. ADD works directly 
with the local defense industry on prototyping and production 
of ADD-development weapons systems, as well as with industry 
think tanks, universities, and research institutes on basic 
and applied research and on core technology development. 
ADD is comprised of seven R&D institutes (precision-guided 
munitions, command, control, communications and computing 
[C4], intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR], ‘neo-
technologies,’ ground systems, naval systems, and aircraft 
systems) and one test center. Each R&D institute operates its 
own network of research laboratories.25
As in Japan, South Korea’s increasingly advanced civilian dual-use 
industries have facilitated the growth of the country’s defense 
sector. The ROK’s improving civilian information technology, 
heavy machinery, shipbuilding, and aerospace sectors have made 
it easier to manufacture more advanced defense systems. In 
addition, the South Korean government has helped the defense 
industry by demanding that foreign partners transfer technology 
and provide other assistance to local firms. Under new 
procurement policies, foreign contractors are required to provide 
a guarantee in advance that the proposed technologies will be 
approved by the respective government or regulatory agencies 
for transfer to South Korea prior to the approval of the offset 
contract. So far, most U.S. defense contractors have acquiesced 
to ROK demands to maintain their strong foothold within the 
country, but their continued cooperation on technological 
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restrictions may prove difficult as ROK firms compete more 
directly with U.S. industries in third-party markets.
Seeking Global Markets
The same factors that have enabled South Korea’s industry to 
substitute for previously imported defense items have made 
them better able to compete for foreign sales: the growing 
sophistication and size of South Korea’s civilian economy, 
the companies’ improving human capital and productivity, 
mandatory technology transfers and offsets, and extensive ROK 
government support for the industry in the form of billions of 
dollars for domestic military contract and R&D efforts. ROK 
governments have favored exports as another means to give 
other countries a stake in South Korea’s security as well as an 
opportunity to create more high-tech jobs and lower unit costs 
for the ROK armed forces through larger production runs. For 
example, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s goal was to make 
the defense industry an “engine of growth” that would make $4 
billion in yearly exports and employ 50,000 people by 2020.26 
From 2001-2008, military aircraft (especially F-16 fighters, K-1 
trainers, and T-50 advanced trainers) accounted for the largest 
percentage (32.1 percent) of the ROK’s total military exports, 
followed by ammunition (22.3 percent), off-set based exports 
(18.3 percent), and artillery and other ground force equipment 
(18 percent).27
The United States has been the main purchaser of South Korean 
arms exports, especially ammunition and parts and services for 
older U.S. combat aircraft. Turkey has been the second largest buyer, 
procuring self-propelled howitzers, trainer jets, and technology for 
a new main battle tank.28 South Korean firms have also contributed 
to meeting the surging demand for arms in Southeast Asia, where 
China’s growing military power and assertive territorial stance 
has been alarming Beijing’s neighbors. The sale of the KAI’s KT-1 
Woongbi and T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer aircraft, jointly 
developed by KAI and Lockheed Martin, to Indonesia in 2011 
made South Korea only the sixth country to export supersonic 
jets.29 Indonesia has also purchased armored personnel carriers, 
infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, 16 T-50 trainers, 
and three Type 209 1,200-ton submarines made by Daewooo 
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, and also agreed to contribute 
one-fifth of the costs for developing South Korea’s experimental 
next-generation fighter jet.30 South Korean firm LIG Nex1 also plans 
to sell the latest antisubmarine technology to Indonesia, including 
the Blue Shark lightweight torpedo, which is a submarine torpedo 
that can be deployed by helicopters, ships, and aircraft.31 In recent 
years, Malaysia has spent from $100 million to $400 million 
annually on South Korean arms.32 Last year, South Korea held its 
first military talks with Vietnam to expand defense cooperation 
and has bolstered ties with the Philippines.33 Thailand has also 
expressed interest in the Surion utility helicopter, developed 
jointly by KAI and Eurocopter, and the T-50 Jet.34 In October 
2013, India signed a contract to buy eight countermeasure ships 
from South Korea’s Kangnam Corp to replace some aging vessels 
purchased from Russia.35 Meeting Indian demands for technology 
transfer, under the offset agreements, two ships will be built in 
Kangnam’s naval shipyard in Busan and India’s Goa Shipyard will 
manufacture the remaining six.36 Furthermore, President Park and 
Philippine President Benigno Aquino III signed a defense industry 
cooperation in October 2013 that calls for enhanced exchanges 
in military technology, defense information, and more visits 
between their military personnel and analysts.37 The Philippines 
is also looking to spend $650 million on South Korean frigates.38 
Earlier this year, South Korea signed a defense cooperation 
agreement with Saudi Arabia, perhaps portending an ROK 
breakthrough in the profitable Middle East arms market that 
would build on previous large sales to Iraq.39
The FA-50 light combat aircraft is proving to be an especially 
popular export item in Southeast Asia, with Indonesia in 2011 
and now the Philippines seeking an inexpensive plane for close-
air support missions. The FA-50 is a light attack variant of the 
T-50. It can be armed with air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, 
machine guns, and precision-guided bombs and its Israel Elta 
System EL/M-2032 PULSE Doppler radar has a range of 100 
kilometers.40 Earlier this year, the Philippines announced that it 
would purchase 12 FA-50s for $443 million to make up for its lack 
of fighter aircraft since retiring its fleet of F-5s in 2005.41
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To meet its goal of selling 1,000 FA-50 and T-50 Golden Eagle 
supersonic trainers during the next 30 years, KAI sees South 
America as an expanding market.42 The DAPA, along with ROK 
firms, have recognized the potential business opportunities 
in South America, as these governments seek to replace aging 
military equipment to enhance security capabilities to keep 
in pace with economic development.43 Since 2006, South 
American countries have imported $48.9 million worth of ROK 
defense gear including trucks, flak vests, ammunition, and 
communication devices.44 In 2010, DAPA Commissioner Chang 
Sooman and Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera signed 
a memorandum, which the ROK hopes will help them break into 
Colombia’s emerging defense industry. Colombia is potentially 
interested in the ROK’s tanks, armored vehicles, and guided 
missiles.45 Last November, KAI signed its first aircraft sale in 
Latin America, when Peru agreed to purchase 20 KT-1 trainers 
worth $200 million.46 Another Korean firm, Daewoo Shipbuilding 
Marine Engineering Co. (DMSE) is seeking a bid to modernize a 
Peruvian naval ship.47 Historically, Colombia has had close ties 
with the U.S. military in order to combat the illegal drug trade, 
but the ROK’s willingness to transfer key technology has enabled 
Colombia to look for alternative suppliers instead of their 
traditional client.
In what the ROK administration hopes will be the first of several 
defense sales to Europe, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski 
said he wanted to purchase the T-50 when South Korean 
President Park Geun-hye visited Poland this October. They also 
agreed to form a bilateral defense cooperation agreement that 
could see Poland considering ROK suppliers for planned upgrades 
to its arsenal of submarines, patrol aircraft, and helicopters.48 
KAI plans to compete directly with Lockheed Martin for the U.S. 
Air Force T-X program contract; the Pentagon could pay several 
billion dollars for the 300 aircraft.49 One technique ROK defense 
firms may employ to further boost their exports is to partner 
with other developing countries seeking to develop their own 
defense industries. For example, South Korean firms have shared 
military technology with Indonesia and partly funded their joint 
development of jet fighters (KFX/IFX) and 1,400-ton submarines.
However, South Korea’s defense industry experienced a significant 
setback in 2012 when Israel selected Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi 
M-346 rather than the Korea Aerospace Industries’ T-50 Golden 
Trainer for a $1 billion contract for 30 new supersonic fighter 
training aircraft.50 Another problem has been that China has 
objected to some ROK defense sales to the Philippines and may 
continue to protest ROK defense exports to Vietnam or other 
countries that have territorial conflicts with Beijing.51 Furthermore, 
the ROK’s defense industry remains heavily focused on meeting 
domestic demand. In contrast, other Western countries expend 
more of their defense production. Exports only account for 7 
percent of defense-related trade in Korea. In 2011, South Korea 
exported $2.3 billion worth of military equipment, but the defense 
industry trade deficit amounted to $8 billion, second only to 
India.52 In addition to South Korea’s heavy domestic consumption, 
ROK firms still lag behind global leaders in some core technologies, 
which they have to import; these include aviation electronics, 
flight/armament controls, stealth/composite materials, rotor 
design, and certification technology related to aviation.53 Defense 
analysts also call on the ROK government to improve the cost 
system, exempt exports from royalties, and work with the defense 
industry to establish a one-stop support service, and take other 
initiatives to expand exports.54
Policy Implications 
It is important not to exaggerate the extent of these changes. The 
United States’ grip on the international arms market is declining, 
while South Korean defense firms are experiencing growth, but 
the United States still remains the largest international arms 
dealer, with a 30 percent share of total arms exports in 2012, 
worth more than $200 billion, while South Korea imported 
nearly 12 percent of U.S. arms exports.55 Furthermore, the 
United States is the world’s largest supplier of combat aircraft 
(62 percent of total exports), which happens to be South Korea’s 
major military import.56 South Korea is the world’s fourth largest 
arms recipient (5 percent) and 55 percent of its total imports are 
military aircraft.57 Almost 77 percent of the ROK’s military aircraft 
comes from the United States.58 The ROK also relies heavily on 
U.S. firms for surveillance and reconnaissance technology.59
South Korea’s unexpected decision earlier this year to annul its 
tender to purchase 60 advanced fighter planes highlights how 
U.S. companies will often remain the supplier of choice for the 
most advanced weapons systems. Boeing’s F-15 Silent Eagle, an 
upgraded version of the F-15E, the dominant model in the ROK 
Air Force, seemed set to win the $7.7 billion tender in the F-X 
fighter acquisition program. This is the most expensive defense 
contract ever offered in the ROK, derived from the need to 
replace its aging fleet of F-5 and F-6 fighters. Boeing’s was the 
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only bid to fall under the proposed parliamentary budget ceiling, 
and would be cheaper to maintain thanks to the ROK’s earlier 
Boeing purchases. Boeing also pledged $2 billion in technology 
transfer and to buy $1.5 billion in South Korean aircraft parts as 
well as build a sophisticated LVC simulator. But the South Korean 
military insisted on considering the more advanced Lockheed 
Martin F-35A (aka the Joint Strike Fighter), which is the only 
genuine fifth-generation fighter (fully stealthy) among those 
planes on offer. Lockheed Martin also pledged to engage in joint 
projects with South Korean companies worth more than $5 
billion, transfer considerable technology to ROK manufactures, 
and launch a military communication satellite that would be 
under South Korean control. 
The government will now develop a new budget and tender, 
which may require raising the spending ceiling, lowering the 
number of planes ordered below 60, or delaying the desired 
entry into the fleet of the first plane after 2017. Although the 
conventional combat aviation threat from North Korea is minimal, 
the ROK military might want the ability to attack North Korean 
nuclear weapons, mobile missiles, or long-range artillery with 
conventional manned aircraft as well as its arsenal of ballistic 
missiles and armed drones. In any case, the ROK Air Force’s 
points of comparison are China and Japan—the latter country is 
buying the F-35 while China is developing its own stealth fighter. 
The other F-X competitor, EADS, offered a strong supplementary 
package along with its Typhoon plane, which included pledging 
to invest $2 billion in the KFX (Korea’s next jet fighter) project 
and produce only 7 Typhoons in Europe and the other 53 in 
South Korea, which would bring technology and jobs to ROK 
industries. The Typhoon—co-developed by three firms from the 
four partner countries of Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain—can 
perform complicated maneuvers at supersonic speeds but lacks 
some stealth capabilities, now considered an essential attribute 
of any top-line air force despite the higher unit costs.60 Since 
the collapse of the deal, Lockheed Martin has taken orders for 
the F-35 from the Netherlands, Britain, Turkey, Australia, Italy, 
Norway, and Japan. Given the increased production of the F-35, 
it is possible that Lockheed Martin will reduce the price of its 
tender bid.61 Boeing, for its part, insists that it has not given up 
and remains engaged with South Korea over the possible sale of 
F-15 fighters.62
Furthermore, in late October 2013, the ROK announced its 
intention to purchase 112 Raytheon GEM-T Anti-Tactical Ballistic 
Missiles from the United States as it develops the KAMD 
(Korean Air and Missile Defense) program.63 The GEM-T is an 
updated version of the PAC-2 system currently in South Korean 
service.64 Pushing forward with KAMD means committing to an 
independent ROK missile shield, although South Korean officials 
insist that it will operate in close concert with its American 
counterpart on the peninsula.65
In any case, the recent fighter and missile defense contracts are 
misleading in that such high-end deals, where only a few Western 
firms can meet the strenuous demands, will be increasingly rare. 
To keep the U.S., a defense partner of choice in more competitive 
tenders, the U.S. treatment of South Korean defense companies 
could prove critical for the future bilateral defense industrial 
relationship. The Pentagon purchased more than $1.1 billion 
worth of South Korean goods and services in fiscal year 2011, 
which marked a 12.6 percent increase from the $991 million 
for FY2010. South Korea’s share of U.S. military procurement 
rose from 3.5 percent to 4.7 percent during the same period, 
making the ROK the Pentagon’s seventh largest foreign national 
vendor. However, the defense trade remains heavily balanced 
in favor of the United States, with South Korea’s Defense 
Acquisition Program Administration continuing to buy major 
U.S. systems. ROK procurement officials may limit purchases 
of the U.S.-made F-35, or demand extensive offsets, due to this 
imbalance. Increased U.S. purchases of South Korean defense 
articles could lessen pressures on ROK officials to buy non-U.S. 
military products. Such purchases should also increase support 
for controversial U.S. defense industrial initiatives, such as its 
ballistic missile defense program, and help reduce tensions over 
ROK-U.S. negotiations regarding how much host-nation support 
South Korea should provide the U.S. 
U.S.-ROK competition on third-party defense markets presents 
less of a problem in terms of alliance relations since their solution 
is to make U.S. defense exports more competitive in general 
rather than just against ROK corporations. Although unable to 
match the quality of some U.S. defense exports, South Korean 
companies can often win contracts based on their lower costs and 
greater ability to transfer military technology to potential buyers. 
Obviously, there are buyers, like the Arab monarchies, who can 
afford to pay the highest prices for the best quality weapons, and 
also hope their purchases generate influence in Washington. But 
many other countries will find South Korean weapons systems 
of sufficient quality for their needs, and also gain from the ROK’s 
South Korea’s Defense Industry: Increasing Domestic Capabilities and  
Global Opportunities
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less restrictive technology transfer policies. But in these respects, 
South Korean firms are joined by Russian and increasingly Chinese 
defense companies, which can capture defense markets where 
the buyer is seeking “good enough” weapons at substantially 
lower costs than their U.S. competitors and with more generous 
technology transfer provisions.66 In addition to ensuring a level 
playing field by denying foreign competitors access to unfair 
subsidies, proprietary information, or proliferation loopholes, 
meeting this challenge will require U.S. defense corporations to 
lower their costs, increase their reliability, and support the Obama 
administration and Congress in their efforts to reform U.S. defense 
export laws and regulations to make it easier for U.S. firms to 
transfer widely available military technologies to foreign buyers 
while still protecting U.S. defense secrets.
Conclusion
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States has been the 
largest supplier of defense systems to South Korea due to the 
imperative of maintaining substantial military interoperability 
with the U.S. armed forces. However, ROK officials have 
increased the amount of defense equipment, technology, and 
services that South Korea acquires from non-U.S. sources, with 
a priority given to domestic suppliers, as part of a general effort 
to diversify South Korea’s international ties and strengthen the 
country’s self-reliance. At first, ROK defense companies’ limited 
private R&D spending, structural inefficiencies, small number of 
exportable products, limited competitiveness in foreign markets, 
and bans on the sale of items with U.S. technology to third 
countries constrained their actual and potential contributions, 
but over time ROK firms have overcome many of these obstacles. 
In addition, the same factors that have enabled South Korea’s 
industry to substitute for previously imported defense items 
have made them better able to compete for foreign sales: the 
growing sophistication and size of South Korea’s civilian economy, 
the companies’ improving human capital and productivity, 
mandatory technology transfers and offsets, and extensive ROK 
government support for the industry. Ensuring that U.S. suppliers 
remain important partners of South Korea requires addressing 
ROK complaints that U.S. companies often fail to provide the best 
deals in terms of cost, performance, and timeliness, and limit 
South Korea’s access to technologies that are readily provided by 
alternative suppliers. Although South Korea’s rising arms exports 
present a challenge for U.S. arms exports, they also offer U.S. 
firms and the Pentagon opportunities to purchase high-quality 
ROK defense items and thereby reinforce the traditional U.S-ROK 
military alliance as the alliance between the United States and 
South Korea continues to transform and strengthen.
Table 1. Statistics: ROK’s Defense Articles Exports [unit: in US$ thousands]
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Exports 24,061 41,782 26,234 25,323 84,493 103,144 116,592 118,797 238,195 235,284
Maneuver 2,428 5,406 2,362 1,849 3,783 36,066 32,458 8,490 7,174 19,144
Warship 7,506 14,997 358 0 2 92 13,698 36,548 108,223 75,162
Aviation 6,305 10,352 16,413 10,169 44,028 25,895 9,893 23,780 84,979 65,283
Fire Arms / Guns 3,971 89 2,482 6,581 2,672 10,190 15,907 11,490 1,203 14,582
Ammunition 2,712 8,114 2,611 5,017 28,805 25,796 23,142 33,376 27,295 38,592
Communication-
Electronics Optics 25 1,754 76 434 1,125 4,022 17,192 2,591 6,338 14,821
Etc. 1,114 1,071 1,932 1,272 4,077 1,082 4,302 2,522 2,984 7,700
Source: Defense Acquisition Program Administration of ROK
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Figure 2: ROK’s Defense Articles Exports
Year
Source: Defense Acquisition Program Administration of ROK.
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